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Any forecast of trends  in world trade in grains  is  foolhardy, and doubly
so  in this year.  The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union brings to an end a remarkable era of grain trading surprises.  The
generation of these surprises for the past quarter century has been the
demonstrated inability of large centrally planned economies  to feed
themselves.  First China and then the Soviet Union abandoned efforts  to  force
agriculture into a socialist mode, with world-wide consequences.  The most
portentous of  these changes  concerns the former Soviet Union.
The historical role of Russia in world grain trading, and later of the
Soviet Union, was  that of a net grain exporter.  This was  true  in the 1950's,
in all but one year  in the  1960's,  and through  1970/71.  This was reversed
dramatically in 1971/72 and especially in 1972/73, when the USSR imported 22.5
million metric tons of wheat and coarse grains, accounting for 17.7 percent of
total world trade in grains.  This was by far the largest amount ever imported
by any one country in a single year, to that date.  The shock effect was
enormous, especially in the United States.  This was not the only cause but it
was certainly the trigger  that ignited the explosion in prices of U.S.
farmland in the  1970's.
The subsequent pattern of  imports was erratic  in the remainder of the
1970's,  dropping to 5.2 million tons  in 1974/75 and reaching 30.5 million tons
in 1979/80.  Since that date, Soviet grain imports fluctuated between 27  and
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Agricultural Issues Roundtable, March 18,  1992.55 million tons,  averaging 35 million tons and 18.5 percent of total world
trade over the past five years  (1987/88 - 1991/92).  Imports  in 1991/92 by the
states  of the former USSR are  forecast at  39 million tons,  accounting for 20.3
percent of total world trade  in wheat and coarse  grains  (Table 1).
This trade volume has dominated world grain trading for two decades, not
only by  its  size but by its variability.  The world's second largest grain
importer, Japan, has imported annually a steady 25  to  28 million tons for the
past ten years.  In the  same period, imports by the USSR or  its  successor
states  fluctuated from 26.8  to 55.4 million tons,  a range  of over 100
percent.
It  is  this volatility that has given the  former Soviet Union its
capacity to  derail any forecasts of future trends  in world trade  in grains.
For the  immediate future, this  is unlikely to change.  Uncertainty about the
future demand for grain by the Commonwealth of Independent States clearly
ranks  at the  top of any list of potential destabilizing forces on the grain
trade  scene.
What are the prospects for a continuation of demand for grain on this
scale by the states of  the former Soviet Union?  In the short run, defined
here as  two to three years, grain imports are almost sure to remain large.  In
a longer time frame, to the end of this  decade,  the situation could reverse
dramatically.
Farm managers of the former USSR know how to  produce grain.  It is
perhaps  the major agricultural  sector in which their technology has resulted
in productivity increases similar  in trend if not yet in level  to those
achieved in the grain belt of North America.  The removal of bureaucratic
interference  from Moscow in the grain economy seems  likely to result in a
2Table 1:  USSR Imports as a  Percentage of Total World Trade
in Wheat and Coarse Grains
1 9 7 0 /7 1 -1 9 9 1 /9 2a
USSR Imports as Percent
Total World Trade in  USSR Imports of  of World Trade in
Wheat  Wheat  Wheat
and  and  and
Trade  Coarse  Coarse  Coarse  Coarse  Coarse  Coarse
Yearb  Wheatc  Grainsd  Grains  Wheat  Grains  Grains  Wheat  Grains  Grains
(Million Metric Tons)  (Percent)
1970/71  54.8  46.3  101.1  0.5  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.8
1971/72  52.4  48.7  101.1  3.5  4.3  7.8  6.7  8.8  7.7
1972/73  67.4  59.4  126.8  15.6  6.9  22.5  23.1  11.6  17.7
1973/74  62.6  71.1  133.7  4.5  6.5  11.0  7.2  9.1  8.2
1974/75  63.9  63.7  127.6  2.5  2.7  5.2  3.9  4.2  4.1
1975/76  66.5  76.4  142.9  10.1  15.5  25.6  15.2  20.3  17.9
1976/77  62.8  82.6  145.4  4.6  5.7  10.3  7.3  6.9  7.1
1977/78  72.9  83.3  156.2  6.9  11.7  18.6  9.5  14.0  11.9
1978/79  72.0  90.2  162.2  5.1  9.9  15.0  7.1  11.0  9.2
1979/80  86.0  100.9  186.9  12.1  18.4  30.5  14.1  18.2  16.3
1980/81  94.1  108.3  202.4-  16.0  23.5  39.5  17.0  21.7  19.5
1981/82  101.3  97.8  199.1  19.5  20.4  39.9  19.2  10.9  20.0
1982/83  98.7  90.0  188.7  20.5  11.3  31.8  20.8  12.6  16.9
1983/84  102.0  93.3  195.2  20.5  11.9  32.4  20.1  12.8  16.6
1984/85  107.0  100.4  207.3  28.1  27.3  55.4  26.3  27.2  26.7
1985/86  85.0  83.2  168.1  15.7  13.6  29.3  18.5  16.3  17.4
1986/87  90.7  83.3  174.0  16.0  10.8  26.8  17.6  13.0  15.4
1987/88  106.1  82.9  189.1  21.5  10.4  31.9  20.3  12.5  16.9
1988/89  97.2  94.2  191.4  15.5  22.5  38.0  15.9  23.9  19.9
1989/90  96.1  100.0  196.1  14.6  23.0  37.6  15.2  22.2  19.2
1990/91  93.1  85.5  178.5  14.8  14.7  29.5  15.9  17.2  16.5
1991/92 e 107.7  84.1  191.8  23.0  16.0  39.0  21.4  19.0  20.3
a US  Dept of Agriculture,  Foreign Agricultural Service, World Grain Situation and Outlook,
FG 2-92, February 1992, and predecessor publications.
b  July-June through 1979-80;  thereafter July-June for wheat, October-September for coarse
grains.
c  Includes wheat flour and products in wheat equivalent.
d  Includes corn, sorghum, barley, oats and rye.
e  Forecast.
3release  of initiative  that could go far to correct the past history of
enormous  losses  in handling, storage, and utilization.  These have exceeded
total grain imports  in all but a few years in the past two decades.
Two  forces may bring about  this  transformation.  The  first is  the
emergence of realistic prices  for grain, coupled with a reform in procurement
methods that will convert post-harvest losses  into diminished income for
producers or handlers.  In the past almost all  loss or wastage after grain
left the farm was borne by government or  its agencies,  and did not reduce
incomes  for any of the  individuals  involved in the distribution chain.  This
seems sure to  change.
More realistic grain prices will  also lead to  improved efficiency in use
of feed grains  in the former USSR.  In the past, and today, the principal use
of wheat was  as  a feed grain.  For the past 15 years the annual  food use of
wheat has been virtually flat, varying from 35  to  37 million tons.  In
contrast, the use of wheat as feed over the  same period averaged 44 million
tons,  and has averaged over 51 million tons  for the past two years.  Anything
that  is  done to  improve efficiency in grain feeding of  livestock will have a
disproportionate  effect on import demand for wheat.
Studies  in the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture and in the  former USSR suggest
that the comparative disadvantage in Soviet production of meat has been
greater than in the production of grain.  If more realistic prices do begin to
guide farm production decisions,  this implies that the successor states  to the
USSR may find it rewarding to  import more meat and less grain.
The feed use  of coarse grains for the past 15 years averaged 77 million
tons per year, with barley comprising the major part.  If  there is  gradual
improvement in feeding efficiency this will reduce the  feed demand for wheat,
4and permit domestic barley to play a larger role.  Wheat can be used for food
or  feed but the food use  of barley is  limited.
This  suggests that a combination of greater reliance on meat  imports and
improvement in the conversion ratios of grain to meat or milk will have  the
effect of reducing import demand for both wheat and coarse grains, but
especially for wheat.
The  second and potentially more powerful force that could lead to a
reduction in grain imports  is  the determination of newly independent states to
reduce dependency on others for their food supply.  No symbol  of that
dependency is  as  strong as  the need to  import grain.  No memory of the
historic role  of Russia in the world trading economy is  as  strong as  the
knowledge  that it once was regarded as  a bread-basket for Europe.  A most
vivid impression from interviews with economic planners  in Russia, Belorussia,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan in 1990 and 1991 was  the  frequency with which they
identified the failure of  the Soviet era with the need to import grain.  Grain
has  the status of an icon of independence in what once was the Soviet Union.
Its  successor states will make heroic efforts to cut back or eliminate grain
imports.  Whether or not it remains true  in the future,  some current economic
advisers in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan regard oil,  gas,  gold and in the
longer run, grain as  their most potent sources of hard currency foreign
exchange.
The one sector in which a drive for self-sufficiency could command the
widest public support  is  grain production.  I do not expect imports by the  CIS
to drive  the demand side of world grain trade after about 1995, as Soviet
demand did for the past twenty years.
5What about prospective trends  in other markets?  When attention  turns
from the former USSR;  the  one most often cited is  China.  Its wheat imports
have been impressive, approaching the USSR level  in two of the past five
years.  But it  is  often forgotten that China is a major exporter of coarse
grains, mostly corn.  In three of the past five years China has been the
world's third largest exporter of coarse grains, after the US and the  EC,  and
ahead of Canada, Argentina, and Australia.
For several years it was fashionable in grain trade circles  to regard
China's corn exports as  an anomaly--more a reflection of internal transport
limitations than of any true comparative advantage.  This  is changing.  With
North China corn-lands a short voyage from Japan, the world's largest importer
of coarse grains,  a view of China as an almost limitless potential import
market for grain needs revision.
Large-volume wheat imports may well continue and even exceed the 15
million ton level of 1991/92.  The sheer size of China's population of 1,151
million guarantees that bad weather could cause enormous fluctuations in
China's  import demand.  But there  is  a considerable potential  for expansion in
grain output.  Yields of wheat are well above those in North America, but only
about three-fourths  of levels achieved in Eastern Europe, and two-thirds of
those in Western Europe.  Big as  it  is  in current world trade  in grain, China
seems unlikely to provide replacement demand for grain on the  scale provided
by the USSR for  the past twenty years.
Two other areas  seem more interesting to  grain exporters.  One is  the
India-Pakistan-Bangladesh-Myanmar  (Burma)-Nepal subcontinent, or what once was
British India.  In 1991 this area, for the first time, surpassed the
population of China (Table 2).  Its  annual rate of natural  increase in
6Table 2:  Population Levels and Growth Rates  in 1991,
Selected States and Regionsa
Estimated
Annual Rate  Population
State or  Population  of Natural  Added in  Projected Population
Region  1991  Increase  1992  2010  2025
(Millions)  (Percent)  (000)  (Millions)
India  859.2  2.0  17,184  1,157.8  1,365.5
Pakistan  117.5  3.0  3,525  195.2  281.3
Bangladesh  116.6  2.4  2,798  176.6  226.4
Myanmar  42.1  1.9  800  58.6  72.2
(Burma)
Nepal  19.6  2.5  490  30.6  41.1
Total  1,155.0  2.15  24,797  1,618.8  1,986.5
(ave.)
Doubling time:  32 years
China  1,151.3  1.4  16,118  1,420.3  1,590.8
Doubling time:  51 years
Former USSR  292.0  0.8  2,336  333.0  363.0
Doubling time:  91 years
USA  252.8  0.8  2,022  299.0  333.7
Doubling time:  88 years
a  Computed from 1991 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau,
Washington, D.C., April 1991
7population is  2.15 percent, or over fifty percent greater than China's 1.4
percent.  Population projections at current rates  of increase give South Asia
as  here defined a population some 200 million larger than China's  in 2010, and
almost 400 million larger by 2025.  This growth  is  occurring in areas with
some of  the highest densities of population per unit of agricultural land in
the world.  It  is  clearly not a unified market area, but it  is  also clearly an
area in which population growth is  exceeding any likely rates of increase  in
agricultural output.
In terms of need, the subcontinent of South Asia seems  likely to provide
the largest  increase  in potential world demand for  imported grain in the next
quarter--century.  With a current population almost double  that of all of
Africa, it appears  to be most vulnerable to disruptions in food supply due to
weather or  internal unrest.  Its greatest handicap  is  the lack of export
capacity to pay for food imports.  Need will not equate with effective demand.
A second area of interest  is North Africa and the Middle East.  In
1989/90, the  last full trade year before the break-up of the Soviet Union and
the  outbreak of the Gulf War, this  area imported 16.4 million tons of wheat,
more than the USSR and China combined.  As  a region, its current population is
larger than that of the former USSR.  Considered as a unit, although it is  far
from unified, its  population is  growing at over 2.8 percent per year, much
faster than the South Asian subcontinent noted above, and over twice the
growth rate  of China (Table 3).  Its  distinguishing feature is  that  this
growth is occurring in an area that has very limited potential for  further
growth in agricultural output, but it does have oil.
Here is  a region in which the combination of need and effective demand
seems likely to provide a growing market for grain imports.  It has not in the
8Table  3:  Population Levels and Growth Rates in 1991,
Selected States, North Africa and Middle Easta
Estimated
Annual Rate  Population
Region and  Population  of Natural  Added in  Projected Population
Country  1991  Increase  1992  2010  2025
(Millions)  (Percent)  (000)  (Millions)
North Africa
Egypt  54.5  2.9  1,581  81.8  105.4
Algeria  26.0  2.7  702  39.1  49.3
Tunisia  8.4  2.2  185  11.5  13.6
Morocco  26.2  2.5  655  37.3  46.2
Libya  4.4  3.1  136  7.1  9.3
Total,  119.5  2.73  3,259  176.8  223.8
North Africa
Middle East
Iran  58.6  3.3  1,934  100.6  141.4
Iraq  17.1  2.7  462  31.0  43.8
Turkey  58.5  2.2  1,287  83.4  102.7
Syria  12.8  3.8  486  25.9  41.4
Yemen  10.1  3.5  354  19.0  29.9
Israel  4.9  1.6  78  6.1  7.2
Jordan  3.4  4.1  139  6.8  10.1
Lebanon  3.4  2.1  71  4.9  6.2
Saudi Arabia  15.5  3.4  527  29.7  44.4
Total,  184.3  2.90  5,338  307.4  427.1
Middle East
Total, States  303.8  2.83  8,597  484.2  650.9
Listed Above
a Computed from 1991 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau, Washington,
D.C.,  April 1991
9past been a large market for coarse grains, and this  is unlikely to change.
But over the decade  of the 1980's it was one of the  fastest growing markets
for wheat.  This may well continue, if political stability can be restored.
Among major regions  of the world, it  could prove to  be the most plausible
successor to  the Soviet market, and especially for wheat.
To  this point, the discussion has focused on the demand side.  What
about exportable supplies?  Here the picture is  less complex, because there
are  fewer major players, but no  less problematic.  Perhaps the  greatest
uncertainty concerns the European Community (Table 4).  After  1987/88  its
exports  of wheat and coarse grains have exceeded those of Canada and been
exceeded only by.the U.S.  It  is  clearly the highest cost export producer of
grain by any realistic reckoning of cost.  It stands as  one of the most
emphatic  abandonments of the principle  of comparative advantage now practiced
on  the world stage.  It  is  maintained by the most objectionable form of tax--a
consumption tax on food, administered through the price system.  Yet it
commands political support from its victims that shows few signs of weakening.
In the long view, the level of subsidized grain exports from the EC
seems unlikely to  continue.  With important elections due  in coming months in
the US  and in several EC member countries, there  is  a prospect that the
uncompromising position of the parties  to the current GATT negotiations may
change--if the negotiations can be kept alive.  It may well be that we have
seen the peak of grain exports from the EC, but there  is unlikely to be  any
rapid decline  in the immediate future.
It  is more  likely that there will be a resurgence of export supplies
from Argentina.  Almost alone among major grain exporters,  it has unexploited
potential for production increases that have been suppressed by internal
10Table  4:  World  Production, Trade, and Export Market Shares
for Wheat and Coarse Grainsa
Export Market  Shares'
Exports  Aus./
Trade  World  World  As  % of  Arg./
Year  Production  Exportsb  Production  US  EC-12  Canada  Others
Million Metric Tons  %  In Percent
1978/79  1,202.3  165.1  13.7  562  8.7  25.1  10.0
1979/80  1,169.3  185.5  15.9  58.6  8.5  25.9  7.0
1980/81  1,175.3  202.4  17.2  55.1  10.7  22.2  12.0
1981/82  1,216.3  199.1  16.4  54.2  10.0  27.0  8.8
1982/83  1,261.6  188.7  15.0  49.9  10.9  30.0  9.1
1983/84  1,177.4  195.4  16.6  48.4  10.1  32.6  8.9
1984/85  1,327.7  207.3  15.6  45.1  13.0  30.6  11.3
1985/86  1,343.3  168.1  12.5  36.5  14.1  35.4  14.0
1986/87  1,366.1  174.8  12.8  43.4  13.2  31.2  12.1
1987/88  1,298.5  189.1  14.6  51.2  12.3  27.3  9.1
1988/89  1,232.8  191.4  15.5  51.7  16.6  19.6  12.1
1989/90  1,340.6  196.1  14.6  52.4  14.8  23.0  9.7
1990/91  1,426.2  178.5  12.5  44.9  15.6  28.2  113
1991/92  1,350.0  191.8  14.2  42.0  16.7  27.0  143
a USDA, FAS, World  Grain Situation  and Outlook, FG 2-92, February  1992,  and predecessor
publications.  Time series  does not  pre-date  1978/79 due to difficulty in assembling  consistent data
for EC-12.
b Trade year is July-June for wheat and October-September for coarse  grains.
c Totals may not add to  100  due to rounding.
11political problems that now seem to be under rational control.
The end of the decade and the millennium may  thus see a decline  in grain
imports by the states of the former Soviet Union, a decline  in exports by the
member states of the  EC, renewed export competition from Argentina, increased
imports by North Africa and the Middle East, and a replacement of  China by the
South Asian subcontinent as  the area where population growth is  providing the
greatest divergence between need and effective demand, and therefore the
greatest threat to stability of expectations in world grain markets.
12